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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This quiet title case arose when after nearly 40 years of enjoying the small piece of the 
family farm given to her by her parents, Jean Coleman was ousted from nearly all of her usable 
property by her new neighbors, Timothy and Carol Baker (collectively "Baker"). 
Terri Boyd-Davis, Brian F. Davis, and Jean L. Coleman (collectively "Coleman") are 
members of the Clark family. Jean is the eldest daughter of the eight children born to Harry and 
Edith Clark. Terri is Jean's niece and a granddaughter of the Clarks. Brian is Terri's husband. 
Together they own a piece of property located north of Sandpoint in the beautiful Selkirk 
Mountains adjacent to the Pack River. Although their property, barely an acre, is small in 
comparison to most properties in its rural location, as a part of the Clark family farm where Jean 
was raised in the 1940s and 1950s, they treasure it. 
Prior to his death in 1975, Harry Clark ("Clark") along with his wife, Edith, had gifted to 
most of their children parcels of the property that made up their family farm. They gifted 
Coleman's property to her via two deeds, the first in 1966 and another in 1970. As he typically 
did, Harry Clark, though he had no formal training to do so, wrote the legal descriptions 
contained in the deeds. 
In 1971, Clark moved a log cabin onto the Coleman property, and it remains on the 
property in the same spot today. Jean Coleman, along with her large extended family and 
friends, has over the years used the property primarily as a recreational property. 
Access to the Coleman property is by way of a dirt road that enters the property from its 
northeast comer where it proceeds a short distance, then turns and continues south a couple 
hundred feet down an easement road along the bank of Pack River. Near the southwestern 
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portion of the Coleman property, the easement road forks and turns easterly, crossing over a 
gully, and then ends south ofthe Coleman cabin. Coleman's property has been accessed across 
the same gully since at least the 1950s when the property was still owned by her parents. The 
Coleman property is surrounded by wetlands on its northern, eastern and western sides, making 
the area south of the Coleman cabin the only usable portion. 
From the early 1970s through 2007, the property adjoining Coleman's to the south, which 
consists of four separate parcels totaling nearly eight acres, was owned by Clifford and Joan 
Johnson ("Johnsons"), who were year-round residents ofthe property. The Johnsons had 
purchased their three northern parcels from the Clarks. The northernmost Johnson parcel, which 
the Johnsons purchased from the Clarks in 1971, adjoins Coleman's and it is this property that is 
the subject of this dispute. 
In 1971, after purchasing their northernmost parcel, Clifford Johnson built a fence. He 
started the fence from the eastern edge of the property, where he believed the northern boundary 
line of his property was located and he extended it in a southwesterly direction the full width of 
the property to slightly past his western boundary. Over the years, Cliff Johnson repaired and 
maintained the fence. In the 1990s, the fence required replacement and he rebuilt it in the same 
location. Over the course of the 36 years that Coleman and the Johnsons were neighbors, the 
Johnsons used the property to the south of the fence and Coleman used the property to the north 
ofthe fence, believing that was the boundary. The Johnsons and Coleman never had a dispute 
concerning the location of the fence or the use and ownership of their propeliies. 
In June 2007, the Johnsons sold their property to Baker. Shortly thereafter, a squabble 
over boundary lines arose between Baker and the owner of the property to the south of them. 
This caused Baker to commission a survey of their property in November 2007. Baker's survey 
indicated that their northern property line encompassed approximately half an acre north of 
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where the fence built by Cliff Johnson was located and it, in fact, showed Baker's northem 
boundary line running straight through the Coleman cabin. The fence built by Johnson was 
identified on the Baker survey as the "existing fence line." Baker's survey also revealed that 
their property consisted of7.90 acres not the 9.36 acres that Baker had believed they purchased 
from the Johnsons. 
Harry Clark, who had written the legal descriptions contained in Coleman's deeds and in 
the Johnson's deeds, died in 1975. In the years following his death, at numerous times and in 
various situations affecting a number of different people, the legal descriptions contained in 
deeds written by the well-intentioned Clark had been found to be problematic, and this time 
tumed out to be no exception. 
Baker, anned with the unexpected findings from their survey, began making claims for 
damages. Apparently believing they had been cheated when they purchased their property, 
initially Baker pursued Johnson, while they at the same time also attempted to take control ofthe 
property used by Coleman north ofthe fence. In the summer of 2008, Baker tore down part of 
the fence that stood on the "existing fence line" and began driving vehicles onto the property 
north of the fence, using the dliveway that leads to the Coleman cabin and across the gully that 
provides access to the Coleman property. Coleman repaired the tom down fence, only to have it 
tom down again. 
Baker's aggressive actions began to make sense to Coleman when Baker's attomey wrote 
Jean Coleman a letter in the fall 0[2008, which stated that Baker had had a survey done and now 
claimed ownership of the property north of the fence line. Baker demanded that Coleman move 
the cabin from where it had stood for the past 37 years. Coleman refused, also claiming 
ownership of the property. For nearly a year and a half from October 2008 through March 2010, 
Coleman and Baker's attomey attempted to resolve the issues related to the disputed property. 
3 
Baker eventually decided to forego their claims against the Johnsons and to instead solely 
pursue their claims against Coleman. In July 2009, Baker and the Johnsons entered into an 
agreement wherein Baker agreed to drop their claims again the Johnsons in exchange for the 
Johnsons agreeing to assist Baker in their claims against Coleman; and although no lawsuit had 
yet commenced, the agreement included the Johnson's agreement to testify at trial. 
Coleman initially knew nothing ofthis agreement and thought progress was being made 
with Baker's attorney in resolving the dispute, when the battle over the property took a turn and 
reached its pinnacle in the spring of2010. During the year's cooler months of March and April 
when Coleman's recreational property was typically not used, Baker and the other defendants] 
engaged in self-help when they came onto the disputed property with heavy equipment and 
proceeded to tear dovlll an even greater section of the existing fence. They cut down trees, 
destroyed vegetation, and built an unsightly chainlink fence in a zig-zag fashion across the 
property, preventing Coleman's use of and access to much of the property. Baker placed locks 
on newly erected gates to prevent Coleman from entering most of the disputed property and 
placed "No Trespassing" signs on the newly erected fence. 
It was Baker's aggressive attempt to wrest control of the disputed property that prompted 
Coleman to file the underlying action on April 20, 2010. 
After a four-day trial was held in March 2011, wherein the deeds to the subject properties 
were found to be ambiguous, the District Court, after considering the descriptions contained in 
the deeds and all the surrounding facts and circumstances, determined that it was the intent of the 
Clarks to convey to Coleman the bulk of the property north of the "fence line." The Bakers, 
1 All other defendants named in the underlying case were dismissed from the case prior to trial. 
Coleman resolved their easement claims in mediation with defendants James and Nellie 
Gilbertson, who own the property adjoining Coleman's to the west. 
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unhappy with the District Court's factual findings now ask this Court to reweigh the evidence 
and set the trial court's findings aside. Coleman asks this Court to quiet title in all the Disputed 
Property north of the fence to them. She asks this Court to do so by applying the correct legal 
standard to the District Court's findings of fact, which shows Coleman proved their boundary by 
agreement claim based on an implied agreement. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Coleman filed their initial complaint on April 19, 2010 and filed an amended complaint 
on April 27, 2010. Therein, they made the following claims: 1) quiet title, 2) adverse 
possession, 3) boundary by agreement, 4) easement, 5) trespass, 6) timber trespass, and 7) 
injunction and order requiring removal of fence. (R., Vol. I, pp. 51-68). Although in their Brief, 
Baker claims Coleman pled "reformation of Coleman's warranty deed" (Appellant's Brief, p. 5), 
this is simply not true. 
The District Court twice granted Coleman's motions to amend their complaint. On 
December 14, 2010, the District Court entered an Order Granting Plaintiffs Leave to Amend 
Their First Amended Complaint to Include Claims for Relief of Punitive Damages Against 
Defendants Timothy and Carol Baker. (R., Vol. III, pp. 420-422). Coleman filed their Second 
Amended Complaint to Quiet Title, for Damages for Timber Trespass and Common Law 
Trespass, for Injunctive Relief, Including Claim for Punitive Damages on January 21, 2011. (R., 
Vol. III, pp. 474-492). On February 23,2011, Coleman filed their third amended complaint, in 
which they included one new claim, that of adverse possession based on written claim oftitle. 
(R., Vol. IV, pp. 679-697). 
On June 7, 2010, Baker filed a Counterclaim against Coleman wherein they brought 
claims to quiet title and for trespass. (R., Vol. II, pp. 193-202). 
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A four day bench trial was held March 28 - 31, 2011. The Court announced during trial 
that it was bifurcating the issues and would limit the trial to a ruling on liability, reserving issues 
on damages to a later time. (Trial Tr., p. 220, L. 7-10). 
On April 28, 2011, the District Court orally announced its findings of fact and 
conclusions oflaw. (Trial Tr., pp. 1020-1048). After its analysis of facts and law, which the 
Court meticulously enumerated, the District Court quieted title in the bulk of the Disputed 
Property to Coleman. Based on the undisputed fact that the deeds at issue in the case were 
ambiguous and subject to a variety of interpretations, the District Court based its ruling on what 
it found to be the intent of the grantor. 
On September 2,2011, the Court ordered Coleman "to conduct a survey consistent with 
the trial decision quieting title in the disputed property to them so that a proper legal description 
can be created and included in an appropriate judgment." The Court ordered that the survey and 
proposed judgment be delivered to the Court and opposing counsel by November 4,2011. (R., 
Vol. 5, p. 886). Coleman complied with the Court's Order. 
On November 15,2011, Baker filed Defendant Bakers' Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed 
Judgment. (R., Vol. V., pp. 900-911). On December 28,2011, Boyd-Davis filed a response to 
Baker's objection. (R., Vol. V, pp. 939-948). On January 20,2012, Baker filed a Supplemental 
Brief to Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Judgment. (R., Vol. VL pp. 958-974) and Boyd-Davis 
filed her response to Baker's supplemental brief (R., Vol. VI, pp. 1000-1024). On March 28, 
2012, the Court ordered a further hearing on Baker's objection to the proposed judgment and 
ordered Coleman's surveyor and expert witness, Robert Stratton to appear at the hearing. (R., 
Vol. VI, pp. 1025-1028). 
On Apri130, 2012, Baker filed a Post-Trial Brief in which Baker had made known their 
intent to appeal the case. Because Baker intended to appeal, they asked the Court to issue a 
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ruling on all the legal theories for which it had not previously issued findings of fact and 
conclusions of law after trial, including adverse possession and boundary by agreement. Baker 
also asked the Court to rule on their affirmative defense oflaches. (R., Vol. VI, p. 1040-1074). 
Boyd-Davis also filed a Post-Trial Brief, in which she requested the Court find Coleman had 
proven their boundary by agreement claims based on an implied agreement. (R., Vol. VI, 1030-
1039). 
On July 13, 2012, the District Court issued its "Memorandum Decision RE: Defendants' 
Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Judgment" (R., Vol. VI, pp. 1075-1084). In its decision, the 
District Court agreed that there were errors in the survey. The Court ordered Coleman to 
prepare a new survey consistent with its ruling and to submit the new survey to the Court "on or 
before Friday, September 7, 2012." (Id. at 1082-1083). Coleman filed a "Notice of Submission 
of Survey, Legal Description, and Letter from Surveyor Robert Stratton" with the Court on 
September 7,2012 (Id. at 1129-1131). The new survey was attached as Exhibit "A." 
On September 13,2012, the Court entered its Partial Judgment Quieting Title in Disputed 
Parcel of Real Property to Plaintiffs Terri Boyd-Davis, Brian F. Davis and Jean L. Coleman. (R., 
Vol. VI, pp. 1133-1135). 
In its Memorandum Decision Re: Remaining Liability Causes of Action in Plaintiffs 
Third Amended Complaint, which the Court had also issued on July 13,2012, the Court altered 
its previous position, finding that the grantor did not intend to convey a small portion of the 
Disputed Propeliy located on its west side to Coleman and therefore, found it to belong to Baker. 
It also found that Coleman had not proved their boundary by agreement claims. (R., Vol. VI, pp. 
1085-11 00). 
This change in ruling necessitated a ruling on Coleman's easement claims because the 
road leading to Coleman Property cut through the small section of property the Court had 
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now quieted in Baker. Thus, on September 26,2012, Boyd-Davis filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of Memorandum Decision RE: Remaining Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' Third 
Amended Complaint, wherein she requested the Court rule upon Coleman's easement claims and 
reconsider its ruling denying Coleman's boundary by agreement claims. (R., Vol. VII, pp. 1139-
1162). On November 29,2012, the Court entered its Supplemental Decision RE: Remaining 
Liability Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint and Order RE: Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Reconsideration of Rule 54(b) Certificate, in which the Court found Coleman had 
prevailed on their easement claims. (R., Vol. VII, pp. 1182-1199). 
On November 29,2012, the Court amended its previously entered partial judgment to 
include the easement to Coleman. It, thus, on that date entered the "final" Partial Judgment 
Quieting Title in Disputed Parcel of Real Property to Plaintiffs Terri Boyd-Davis, Brian F. Davis 
and Jean L. Coleman. (R., Vol. VII, pp. 1200-1203). 
Baker filed their Amended Notice of Appeal from the November 29,2012 Partial 
Judgment on January 9,2013. (R., Vol. VII, pp. 1204-1223). Respondent Terri Boyd-Davis 
filed her Amended Notice of Cross Appeal on January 25,2013. (R., Vol. VII, pp. 1226-1233). 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. Respondents Jean L. Coleman ("Ms. Coleman"), Terri Boyd-Davis ("Boyd-
Davis"), and Brian Davis ("Davis") (collectively "Coleman") jointly own a parcel of real 
property of slightly over an acre located in a rural area of Bonner County, Idaho along the Pack 
River in the Selkirk Mountains. 
2. Ms. Coleman acquired this parcel of property from her parents, Harry and Edith 
Clark ("Clarks") by way of two conveyances, the first on October 17, 1966 (Ex. D), which 
contained the northern part of the property and the latter on December 23, 1970 (Ex. F), which 
contained the southern paIi of the property ("Coleman Property"). On June 11,2009, Ms. 
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Coleman placed her niece and her niece's husband, Boyd-Davis and Davis, on title to the 
property. (Ex. 5). 
3. The Clarks owned a great deal of property in this area of Bonner County ("Pack 
River Valley"), which they first acquired in the 1940s. (Trial Tr., p. 144, L. 6-14; Ex. 1). The 
Clarks farmed their land and raised cattle and other animals. (Trial Tr., P. 147, L. 15-16). 
4. Ms. Coleman had grown up in the Pack River Valley along with her many 
siblings. The Clarks had a total of eight children. When their children were adults, the Clarks 
began gifting parcels oftheir land to them. (Trial Tr., p. 145, L. 24-25; p. 146, L. 1-13) 
Although Harry Clark was not a surveyor or engineer, he wrote the legal descriptions contained 
in his deeds. (Trial Tr., p. 147, L. 17-18). In 1975, Harry Clark died. (Trial Tr., p. 715, L. 13-
14). 
5. At the time when Ms. Coleman's parents deeded her the Coleman Property, the 
parcel adjoining hers to the south and the parcel adjoining hers to the west were still owned by 
the Clarks. (Trial Tr., p. 154, L. 9-12). After deeding the property to Coleman, her father 
showed Coleman the location of the property described in the deed. (Trial Tr., p. 147, L. 19-25; 
p. 148, L. 1-17). The Coleman Property is surrounded by wetlands on its northern, eastern and 
western sides. (Trial Tr., p. 163, L. 12-21). 
6. The log home where Ms. Coleman had grown up and where her parents still 
resided ("Homestead") was located just north of Coleman's Property across Upper Pack River 
Road. (Trial Tr., p. 148, L. 3-6). The Clarks had a road that led from their Homestead to 
Coleman's Property that they had used for many decades before gifting the Coleman Property to 
Ms. Coleman. (Trial Tr., p. 746, L. 16-25, p. 744, L. 1-3). The wetland gully located on the 
western side of Coleman' s Property contained a culvert to allow vehicles to gain access to the 
property. (Trial p. 180, L. 4-10). 
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7. On September 3, 1971, the Clarks sold the parcel adjoining the Coleman Property 
on the south to Clifford and Joan Johnson ("Johnsons"). (Ex. 7). The Johnson's property was 
made up of a total of four parcels, three of which they had obtained from the Clarks. (Ex. 6, 8, 
9). 
8. Shortly after the Johnsons acquired the parcel adjoining the Coleman Property, 
Mr. 10hnsons built a wooden fence on the north end of his property. He started the fence on the 
eastern side from where he believed his property line was. (Trial Tr., p. 385, L. 12-23; p. 416, L. 
5-15). He also placed a gate on the fence. The 10hnsons only drove through the gate, drove 
across the road and across the culvert when they purchased hay from the Clarks, who had a hay 
field on the property that adjoined the Coleman Property on the western side. At some point 
prior to Harry Clark's death in 1975, the 10hnsons quit buying hay from the Clarks, and Clifford 
Johnson closed up the gate on the fence. After that time, the 10hnsons never drove across the 
fence line. In the 1990s, Clifford 10hnson replaced the wooden fence with a metal fence. (Trial 
Tr., p. 391, L. 11-25; p. 291, L. 1-20; p. 396, L. 7-10). The 10hnsons did not use the property 
north of the fence. Joan Johnson believed the property on the north side of the fence belonged to 
Ms. Coleman. (Trial Tr., p. 355, L. 10-20). 
9. Clifford 10hnson had been a good friend of Harry Clark's. Ms. Coleman and the 
10hnsons had a friendly relationship. (Trial Tr., p. 187, L. 6-12). During the 36 years that they 
owned their adjoining properties, they never had a dispute or any discussion at all over the 
boundary lines. (TrialTr.,p.190,L.3-7;p.191,L.l-14). 
10. In 1971, Harry Clark and a friend moved a log cabin onto the Coleman Property. 
The cabin has remained in the same location ever since and is still on the property today. (Trial 
Tr., p. 165, L. 2-19). 
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11. From the early 1970s, Coleman used the property as a recreational property. She 
also allowed her siblings and extended family to use the property. Over the years, it was used for 
camping and summer recreation. (Trial Tr., p. 146, L. 25; p. 147, L. 1-4; p. 164, L. 21-25; p. 
165, L. 1,20-25; p. 166, L. 1-25; p. 167, L. 1-25; p. 168, L. 1-25). Coleman allowed her sister, 
Mary Pandrea, to use the cabin as a summer home from 2003 through 2008. (Trial Tr., p. 183, L. 
11-25; p. 184, L. 1-20). During the 1990s, Coleman allowed a friend, Bob Camp, to reside on 
the property year-round. (Trial Tr., p. 171, L. 20-24). Coleman did not use the property south of 
the fence. (Trial Tr., p. 223, L. 8-13; p. 224, L. 24-25; p. 225, L. 1-5). 
12. On June 1,2007, the Johnsons sold their property to Appellants Timothy and 
Carol Baker. (Ex. 10). After purchasing the Baker Property, a squabble over boundary lines 
arose between Baker and the neighbor to the south of the Baker property, prompting Baker to get 
their property surveyed. (Trial Tr., p. 907, L. 12-25). As a result of the survey, they discovered 
that their property contained 7.9 acres rather than the 9.38 acres they believed they had 
purchased. Their survey indicated that their northern boundary line dissected Coleman's cabin. 
(Ex. C, Trial Tr., p. 363, L. 7-20). 
13. Prior to the 2007 survey by the Bakers, no one including the J ohnsons, were 
aware of where the exact boundary lines of the properties were. (Trial Tr., p. 349, L. 17-25). 
14. In approximately the spring of 2008, a portion of the metal fence located on the 
"Existing Fence Line" was tom down by the Bakers or their agents. In the fall of2008, a dispute 
over the boundaries arose between Coleman and Baker. (Trial p. 197, L. 11-22). Coleman 
rebuilt the fence. (Trial Tr., p. 209, L. 10-24). 
15. Coleman first discovered Baker made claims to the Disputed Property when she 
received a letter from Baker's attorney in September 2008. (Trial Tr., p. 196, L. 19-25; p. 197, 
L. 1-4). In the fall of2008 through early 2010, Coleman was in communications with 
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defendants' counsel in attempts to reach a resolution ofthe boundary dispute. (Trial Tr., p. 568, 
L. 19-25; p. 569, L. 1-25; p. 570, L. 1-21). 
16. Baker and their agents trespassed upon Coleman's property and caused damage to 
it. In March and April 201 0, Baker, Mary Pandrea, Nellie Gilbertson and John Pandrea 
conspired together to engage in self-help activities on the Disputed Property. They removed 
much of the remaining metal fence and erected a chainlink fence throughout much of the 
Disputed Property. They brought heavy equipment onto the property, tore out and cut down 
trees and other vegetation. They tore up the land and made changes to the private road that 
serves the Coleman Property. (Ex. 27; Trial Tr., p. 212, L. 5-11; p. 213, L. 2-16). 
II. STANDARDOFREVIEW 
If an instrument is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations, it is ambiguous, and 
its construction is a question of fact. Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 612 P.2d 135 (1980). 
Inconsistencies in a deed may throw a shadow of ambiguity over an instrument, thereby 
warranting the introduction of parol evidence as an aid to discovering the intention of the parties. 
Gardner v. Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767, 770,450 P.2d 990, 993 (1969). Where an instrument is 
ambiguous, interpretation of that instrument is a matter of fact for the trier of fact. Latham v. 
Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 673 P.2d 1048 (1983). 
The standard of review of a trial court's findings of fact is set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a). A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are 
clearly erroneous." Farr West lnv. V. Topaz Mktg. L.P., 148 Idaho 272, 275, 220 P.3d 1091, 
1094, (2009). The appellate court's review of findings of fact is limited. The appellate court 
does not weigh the evidence as the district court did; instead it inquires whether the findings of 
fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence and therefore not clearly erroneous. 
Viebrockv. Gill, 125 Idaho 948, 951, 877 P.2d 919, 922 (1994). By its own tenns, Rule 52{a) is 
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strengthened, but not limited, by regard for a trial court's special opportunity to evaluate the 
credibility of witnesses who appear and testify. T-Crafi Aero Club, Inc. v. Blough, 102 Idaho 
833,837,642 P.2d 70, 74 (CLApp. 1982). A trial court resolves conflicting evidence and 
determines the weight, credibility and inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Angleton v. 
Angleton, 84 Idaho 184,370 P.2d 788 (1962). Upon appellate review, the findings of fact of the 
trial court will be accepted if they are supported by substantial, competent though conflicting 
evidence, however meager. Jensen v. Bledsoe, 100 Idaho 84, 593 P.2d 988 (1979). Evidence is 
regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining 
whether a disputed point of fact has been proven." Argosy Trust v. Wininger, 141 Idaho 570, 
572, 114 P.3d 128, l30 (2005). The appellate court will not substitute its view of the facts for 
the view ofthe district judge. Carney v. Heinson, l33 Idaho 275, 281, 985 P.2d 1137, 1143 
(1999). 
Whether or not a party is guilty oflaches primarily is a question of fact and therefore its 
determination is within the province of the trial court. It is reviewed under the abuse of 
discretion standard. Huppert v. Wolford, 91 Idaho 249, 420 P.2d 11 (1966). 
Review of the lower court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence 
supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. 
Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co .. 119 Idaho 946, 812 P.2d 253 (1991). The appellate court 
exercises free review over the lower court's conclusions oflaw to determine whether the court 
correctly stated the applicable law, and whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts 
found. Burns v. Alderman, 122 Idaho 749, 752-53, 838 P.2d 878, 881-82 (Ct. App. 1992). 
III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Does the evidence in the record support the conclusion of law reached by the 
District Court that Coleman had not proven their claims of boundary by 
agreement! acquiescence? 
IV. ARGUMENT TO DISPUTE APPELLANT BAKER'S CONTENTION THAT THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
A. The District Court's findings of fact are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence and should not be disturbed on appeal. 
In this case, the District Court quieted title in the bulk of the property in dispute to 
Coleman. It reached its decision by determining what the intent of the grantor of the ambiguous 
deeds in question were. Baker admits that the Coleman deeds are ambiguous and concurs that 
the District Court was thus tasked with the duty of determining the intent of the grantor. Because 
Baker does not have a valid attack on the legal standard applied by the District Court in reaching 
its decision, Baker defaults to attacking the District Court's decision by asserting its findings of 
fact are "clearly erroneous," knowing that without such a finding, the appellate court will not set 
the District Court's decision aside. 
Within their brief, Baker reargues their version of the facts of the case to this Court, 
apparently hoping the appellate court will reweigh the evidence, adopt Baker's arguments, and 
set aside the trial court's findings of fact. This, however, is not the mission ofthe appellate 
court. 
Our review of findings of fact is limited. We do not weigh the evidence as the 
district court did; instead we inquire whether the findings of fact are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence and therefore not clearly erroneous. I.R.c.P. 
52(a); State ex rei. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 144,594 P.2d 1093, 1097 
(1979). In reviewing the record, we are mindful that the district court possesses 
the unique opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses appearing before 
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it. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Glenn v. Gotzinger, 106 Idaho 109, 110-11,675 P.2d 824, 826-
27 (1984). 
Viebrock v. Gill, 125 Idaho 948, 951,877 P.2d 919,922 (1994). 
The proper inquiry to be undertaken by this Court in response to Baker's allegation that 
the District Court's findings of fact are "clearly erroneous" is to detennine whether the findings 
of fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence. A review of the record confinns 
that they are. A review of the record further confinns that Baker's analysis is fatally flawed 
because the bulk of Baker's Brief is devoted to pointing out what Baker claims are "clearly 
erroneous" errors on a survey that is not a part of the record on appeal and is not the one adopted 
by the District Court. 
During the four-day trial, the District Court heard and considered the testimony of both 
the plaintiffs' and the defendants' expert witnesses, both surveyors. It heard and considered the 
testimony of fact witnesses of both parties, which included the testimony of the Baker's 
predecessors, Clifford and Joan Johnson, as well as testimony from persons familiar with the 
history and use of the disputed property, among them three of the Clark's other children (Jean 
Coleman's sisters), and testimony from the parties themselves. The District Court reviewed 
extensive exhibits, including numerous deeds, surveys, and photographs. 
One month after trial when the District Court announced its decision in open court, it 
stated: "My decision today that is going to be announced is based on the law, the facts as 
presented through the testimony, and the exhibits and the interpretations of both the law and the 
facts by way oflogic and common sense." (Trial Tr., p. 1020, L. 22-25; p. 1021, L. 1). 
The District Court cited a variety of reasons why it detennined that the Clarks intended to 
convey the property north of the fence line to Coleman. Because the deeds were ambiguous and 
the District Court understood its task was to construe the deeds to give effect to the intent of the 
parties, it discussed applicable case law, including Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399 (2008), 
quoting from that case: '"'The trier of fact must then determine the intent of the parties according 
to the language of the conveyance and,' and this is the important part as it related to my decision, 
'and the circumstances surrounding the transaction. '" (Trial Tr., p. lO35, L. 4-8). 
It considered the testimony of Jean Coleman, stating "[t]he gist of Jean Coleman's 
testimony was that after she received the real property, her father walked the property with her 
and showed her the boundary lines2." (Trial Tr. p. 1025, L. 5-8). 
It considered the testimony of Clifford Johnson, predecessor to the Bakers, who had built 
the fence that stood on the "fence line." Though Mr. Johnson, who was a premier witness for the 
defense, denied that he believed the fence marked the boundary between the properties, the 
District Court found it "telling" that he referred to the property south of the fence as "my side of 
the fence.3" (Trial Tr., p. lO28, L. 5). The District Court also found that Clifford Johnson's 
"testimony ... was impeached" and that "[h]e was shown to have a bias," stating: 
This court does not accept his statement that he would have begun the fence at 
what he thought was the northeast corner of his property and then go willy-nilly 
off what he believed to be the line which then would conveniently fit the theory of 
the defense4. Further, the use as evidenced by the parties reflect that they treated 
the fence line as the boundary line. The Johnsons never used the property north 
of the line and they shut off the gate so as to preclude them from having access, at 
least by vehicle, to the northern portion of what is now claimed to have been their 
piece - their portion of property . They also rebuilt the fence in the same 
position6. 
2 This finding is supported by the evidence. See Trial Tr., p. 147, L. 19-25; p. 148, L. 1-17; p. 
150, L. 9-19. 
3 This finding is supported by the evidence. See Trial Tr., p. 421, L. 3-4. See also Trial Tr. p. 
403, L. 16-17. 
4 This finding is supported by the evidence. See Trial Tr., p. 385, L. 12-23; p. 416, L. 5-15. 
5 This finding is supported by the evidence. See Trial Tr., p. 391, L. 11-25; p. 291, L. l-lO. 
6 This finding is supported by the evidence. See Trial Tr., p.396, L. 7-10. 
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(Trial Tr., p. 1040, L. 2-15). 
The District Court considered the improvements made to the property, the topography of 
the property, and the use made of the property and how that related to the grantor's intent It 
noted "[ e ]vidence ... hal d] been presented show[ ing] that cars were parked, there was a placement 
of the clothes line, there was testimony concerning the use of the property south of the cabin 
towards the fence line, there were camp fires that had been made. 7" (Trial Tr., p. 1029, L. 19-
23). 
It found that "Mr. Clark would not have moved a cabin for his daughter so that it sat on 
the boundary line of the real property that. .. he and his wife conveyed to her. 8" (Trial Tr., p. 
1038, L 17-20). It noted that Coleman's parents would have intended to convey usable property 
to her, stating: 
When consideration is given to the topography, the fact that a substantial amount 
of Jean Coleman's real property to the north and west of the cabin was wet, it 
would make sense that Jean Coleman would receive property that was not wet for 
purposes of use, thus, the road, the parking area and the dryer area approaching 
where the then existing fence was as shown on the surveyor's - on the surveys 
demonstrates the intent of Mr. Clark. And by that I mean demonstrates the intent 
ofMr. Clark to convey usable property to Ms. Coleman9. 
(Trial Tr., p. 1038, L. 21-25; p. 1039, L. 1-7). 
7 This finding is supported by the evidence. All of the fact witnesses testified about the use of 
the property south of the fence. Additionally, this finding is supported by multiple exhibits in 
evidence, including Defendants' Exhibits HH, NN, LLL, MMM and Plaintiffs' Exhibits 24, 29-
30,34-36,39,45. 
8 This finding is supported by the evidence. See Trial Tr., p. 165, LA-IS; p. 747, L. 19-25; p. 
748,L.1-8. 
9 This finding is supported by the evidence. See Trial Tr., p. 163, L. 12-21; p. 755, 21-25; p. 
L. 1-8.; p. 843, L. 7-15. 
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The District Court considered, discussed, and compared the testimony of the expert 
witnesses of both sides and discussed the many surveys that had been made of the property over 
the years and how they all interpreted the ambiguous deeds differently, stating: 
As testified to by both Mr. Stratton and to a certain extent by concessions of Mr. 
Evans, the other surveyor who testified, that both of the the Deeds to both Ms. 
Coleman and Mr. and Mrs. Johnson had legal descriptions that were prepared by a 
lay person, that is not by a civil engineer, not by a surveyor, and not by someone 
with expert training in writing or preparing legal descriptions I 0. As I mentioned 
earlier, both surveyors agreed that the Deeds that were given were ambiguous and 
needed to be interpreted II. Both surveyors agreed that the senior Deeds, which 
are recorded earlier, take precedence over later descriptions 12• And both 
surveyors agreed that all four surveys: The 1979, the 1981, the 2007, and the 
unrecorded Tucker plat of the survey as set forth in Exhibit 23 all are different 
interpretations of the same set ofDeeds13. 
(Trial Tr., p. 1035, L. 15-25; p. 1036, L. 1-5) 
It discussed the various possible interpretations of the Coleman deeds that Coleman's 
expert had corne up with, stating, "In addition, I do find that Mr. Stratton, whose [sic] also a 
surveyor, also did field work and carne up with different examples of how the legal descriptions 
would or could lay on the groundI4." (Trial Tr., p. 1031, L. 21-24). 
It evaluated the testimony of Baker's expert witness: 
I do also want to comment as to Mr. Evans. Although he believes his survey is a 
reasonable interpretation, he unequivocally stated during the course of the trial, "I 
based my survey on the Tucker surveysI5." We know, as has been outlined, that 
10 This finding is supported by the evidence. See Trial Tr., p. 48, L. 25; p. 49, L. 1-8; p. 866, L. 
14-17. 
11 This finding is supported by the evidence. See Trial Tr., p. 42, L. 16-25; p. 43, L. 1-5; p. 864, 
L. 17-25. 
12 This finding is supported by the evidence. See Trial Tr., p. 68, L. 6-12; p. 892, L. l3-24. 
13 This finding is supported by the evidence. See Trial Tr., p. 64, L. l3 through p. 68, L. 9; p. 
936, L. 15-24. 
14 This finding is supported by the evidence. See Trial Tr., p. 44, L. 2-3; p. 137, L. 1-6. 
15 This finding is supported by the evidence. See Trial Tr., p. 880, 20-21. 
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the Tucker surveys had the starting point of the Coleman property on the north 
side of the Pack River Road. And when I say the Tucker surveys, I'm talking 
about the '79 and '81 surveys that were recorded which doesn't make sense16. 
In addition, Mr. Evans began with the legal description of the conveyance from 
Clark to the 10hnsons and then went from the 10hnsons to the Bakers. While he 
may accurately have prepared a survey showing what those Deeds reflected, such 
an interpretation ignored the potential senior - the potentially senior rights of Ms. 
Coleman and ignored some of the notes of Mr. Tucker that showed the problems 
with the overlap. And when I say "ignored," that's not exactly accurate. I say he 
ignored because he didn't have them. He hadn't seen them17. 
On cross examination, Mr. Evans conceded that he had not seen the note of Mr. 
Tucker, specifically Exhibit 24 nor Exhibit 23, and that would cause him to re-
think his survey18. Simply stated, Mr. Evan's testimony was impeached. 
(Trial Tr., p. 1041, L. 7-25; p. 1042, L. 1-7). 
In announcing its decision and stating its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the 
District Court stated: 
In determining the intent of the grantors, the interpretation of the senior Deeds 
[the Coleman deeds] as made by Mr. Stratton and as depicted in figure 6 seems 
most consistent with the intent of the Clarks as followed through with by the 
placement of the fence and thus of the property by the adjacent owners thereafter; 
therefore, as a conclusion of law, I do find and do conclude that the real property 
north of the fence line is quieted in the plaintiffs. This decision is based on the 
reasoning set forth today and the evidence submitted at the time of triaL" 
(Tr., Court Trial, p. 1043, L. 2-12). 
The District Court's decision is sound. Its findings of fact are supported by substantial 
and competent evidence and its decision should be upheld. 
16 This finding is supported by the evidence. See Trial Tf., p. 42, L. 20-25; p. 43, L. 1-5. 
17 This findings is supported by the evidence. See Trial Tr., p. 891, L. 19-25; p. 892, L. 1-24. 
This finding is supported by the evidence. See Trial Tr., p. 924, L. 19-25; p. 925, L. 1-13. 
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1. The District Court's rmding that Clark intended to convey to Coleman the 
property north of the line upon which the fence was built is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. 
The essence of Baker's argument is found in their claim that "the Court's trial decision is 
clearly erroneous, because it is based upon a finding that the Clark's intended to convey up to a 
fence that did not exist at the time of the conveyance." (Emphasis added.) When the District 
Court found that Clark intended to convey to Coleman the property north of the "fence line," this 
was not based on the fact that a fence existed on the line at the time of the conveyance; rather, it 
found that the reason the fence was built and later rebuilt upon that line was because that was 
where Clark intended the boundary line between the properties to be. (Trial Tr., p. 1029,1.4-
16; p. 1040,1. 4-15; 24-25, p. 1040,1.1-6). 
Throughout their brief, Baker confuses and interchanges "fence line" for "fence." It is 
one thing to argue the fence did not exist at the time of conveyance. It is another to argue the 
fence line did not exist. Of course, the fence line existed at the time of conveyance. It is, 
afterall, simply a location on the ground on which a fence was built. 
Baker argues that the District Court "erroneously relied upon features that did not exist at 
the time the Clarks conveyed the property." Baker disputes that there was a driveway leading 
into the disputed property but his own witness, Clifford Johnson, testified that there was a 
driveway that went into the Coleman Property in the early 1970s. (Trial Tr., p. 386,1. 24). 
Additionally, Baker uses his own exhibit, Exhibit NN (a photograph), to prove that there was no 
"parking area" on the disputed property in the early 1970s while this very photograph shows a 
truck in the background parked in the "parking area." 
Baker also claims the shape of the fence contradicts a finding that it was intended to mark 
a boundary line. The shape of the fence from the eastern to western boundary of the Coleman 
property, however, is a straight line as is obvious from Baker's own survey (Ex. C). When 
Baker claims the fence turns twice and "lies in a fish hook pattern," they are referring to the 
fence that lies outside of the western boundary of the Baker property and extends over into the 
Gilbertson property. The property where that fence is located is not in dispute in this case. 
Addtionally, the fence was built where it was because, as the District Court found, that was 
where Clark intended the boundary to be and not vice versa. Thus, this argument is irrelevant 
and misleading. 
Baker also would like this Court to rely on Cliff Johnson's testimony despite the fact that 
the District Court found his testimony to be biased. (Trial Tr., p. 1040, L. 2-3). Evidence was 
admitted at trial that showed the Johnsons had agreed to testify in support of Baker's claims 
against Coleman in exchange for the Baker's agreement to dismiss claims they had initially 
pursued against the Johnsons. (Trial Tr., p. 361 L. 16-25; p. 362, L. 1-25; p. 363, L. 1-16; Ex. 
59). 
Baker attempts to convince this Court that what happened after Clark conveyed the 
properties is not relevant to Clark's intent but the line the parties treated as the boundary is 
relevant because it sheds light on what Clark intended to convey and what the grantees believed 
he had conveyed. 
The District Court findings were made by considering all the facts and circumstances, 
and the fact that Johnson built and later rebuilt the fence on this line was but one piece of 
evidence that supports the finding that this was the grantor's intended boundary line. (Trial Tr., 
p. 396, L. 3-10). 
2. The District Court's weighing of the testimony of the expert witnesses was 
within its purview and its reliance thereon was proper. 
Baker also takes issue with the District Court's reliance upon the testimony of Coleman's 
expert witness, surveyor Robert Stratton and the District Court's finding that Stratton's "figure 6 
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seems most consistent with the intent of the Clarks." In claiming that this is "clearly erroneous," 
Baker again puts forth their version of the facts and makes argument as to why they disagree 
with the District Court's analysis and findings in apparent expectation that this Court will 
reweigh that evidence. 
The District Court, in applying the correct legal standard for interpreting the ambiguous 
deeds by taking into consideration all the surrounding facts and circumstances, relied in part on 
the testimony of the expert witnesses. This was proper. 
In addition to the various surveys prepared by other surveyors, including Baker's expert, 
Dave Evans, all of which contained different interpretations of the ambiguous deeds, Stratton 
additionally created a number of possible drawings showing various possible interpretations of 
the ambiguous legal descriptions contained in Clark's deeds. (Ex. 16, Figures 1-8). 
In one of Stratton's drawings (Figure 6), he rotated the legal description to fit the fence 
line. Contrary to Baker's assertion, by doing this, Stratton did not "assume that Harry Clark 
could have known where the fence would be located." Rather, Stratton rotated it so that it would 
fit better with the road and once he did so, he found it to be the best fit with the deeds. (Trial Tr., 
p. 55,L. 5-21;p. 108,L.21-24;p.117,L. 1-4). 
a) Baker makes a serious error by referencing and analyzing in their 
Brief an earlier Stratton survey that was rejected by the District 
Court and is not in the record rather than referring to the correct 
Stratton Survey that the Court accepted 
To support their statement that "while extrinsic evidence can be considered to resolve an 
ambiguity in the deeds, such evidence cannot completely supplant the deeds themselves," Baker 
cites to a foreign case. Their attempt to claim the District Court's interpretation of the 
ambiguous deeds "supplanted" the deeds is misleading. According to the Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, the definition of "supplant" is "to eradicate and supply a substitute for." 
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("supplant." Merriam-Webster. com. 2014. http://www.merriam-webster.com (17 January 2014). 
This is not the same as interpreting an ambiguous deed and it is not what the District Court did. 
In Baker's defense, however, their belief that Stratton's Figure 6 somehow "supplants" 
the deed is based on two significant errors Baker makes. First, instead of referencing the survey 
prepared by Stratton that was adopted by the District Court and submitted to the court on 
September 7, 2012 ("Stratton Survey") (R, Vol. VI, pp. 1129-1131, Exhibit A), Baker references 
and analyzes the wrong survey - one that was rejected by the District Court and even includes 
a drawing of the wrong survey on Page 28 of their Brief The survey Baker references was 
submitted to the court on November 4,2011 and was rejected by the court it its July 13,2012 
decision. (R, Vol. VI, p. 1075-1084). 
Baker's second serious error, which is undoubtedly a result of their first error in 
referencing the wrong survey is that they fail to properly construe Stratton's Survey, at least the 
correct version of Stratton's Survey the one adopted by the District Court. 
Baker's error is this. On November 15,2011, Baker filed Defendant Bakers' Objection 
to Plaintiffs' Proposed Judgment. (R, Vol. v., pp. 900-911) and he filed a supplemental brief 
objecting to the survey on January 20, 2012. (R, Vol. VI, pp. 958-974). On December 28, 
2011, Boyd-Davis filed a response to Baker's objection (R, Vol. V, pp. 939-948), and also filed 
a response to Baker's supplemental brief (R., Vol. VI, pp. 1000-1024). On March 28, 2012, the 
Court ordered a further hearing on Baker's objection to the proposed judgment and ordered 
Coleman's surveyor and expert witness, Robert Stratton to appear at the hearing. (R, Vol. VI, 
pp. 1025-1028). 
In the objection and supplemental obiection filed by Baker, they made the same 
arguments about errors in the survey they make now before this Court. But the District Court 
already addressed this issue and made the corrections that Baker now complains about again 
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to this Court. On July 13,2012, the District Court issued its "Memorandum Decision RE: 
Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Judgment" (R., Vol. VI, pp. 1075-1084). In its 
decision, the District Court agreed that there were errors in the survey. It found that: 
[T]he legal description in the proposed judgment does not reflect a reasonable 
interpretation of the western boundary of the disputed property. Because a 
finding was made in the trial decision that it was Harry Clark's intent to convey 
land up to the fence line, as reflected by Mr. Stratton's Figure 6, it is now 
determined that the western boundary line of the disputed parcel is also in accord 
with Mr. Stratton's interpretation of the Coleman deeds, as reflected by Figure 6. 
(R., Vol. VI, p. 1082). 
The District Court ordered "that the plaintiffs shall have a new survey performed 
forthwith, reflecting the finding made in this decision as to the land to the north of the 1970 
Fence Line and consistent with the finding as to the western boundary." (Id. at 1082-1083). The 
Court ordered the plaintiffs to submit the new survey to the Court "on or before Friday, 
September 7,2012." (Id. at 1083). Coleman submitted their new survey as ordered by the Court 
on September 7, 2012 (Id. at 1129-1131). The new survey (Exhibit "A") is a part of the Record 
before this Court as shown on the "Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits," on page 8 (R., Vol. VII, 
unnumbered but found after p. 1233). The survey drawing in Baker's Appellant's Brief on page 
28 is taken from the survey that was rejected by the District Court in its July 13,2012 decision. 
Below is the correct drawing taken from the correct survey adopted by the District Court and 
attached as Exhibit A to "Notice of Submission of Survey, Legal Description, and Letter from 
SurveyorRobertStratton."(R., Vol. VI,pp. 1129-1131). 
/ 
The survey drawing on 
page 28 of Appellant's 
Brief shows both of these 
dotted lines as solid 
lines. To correspond 
with Stratton's Figure 6, 
this drawing shows the 
western boundary further 
west (as indicated by the 
solid line). 
The survey drawing on 
I 
page 28 of Appellant's Brief 
shows the Disputed 
Property quieted in 
Coleman to extend to this 
line. To correspond with 
:~~~~:' ______ ~~~I Stratton's Figure 6, this 
~ drawing moves the western 
boundary further east (as 
indicated by t~e bold so!id 
line). 
A comparison of the above drawing to the one shown on page 28 of the Appellant's Brief 
reveals a number of significant differences between the two surveys: 
• The heaviest dark lines in a triangular shape on the above drawing designated "Area of 
Overlap T-24 and T-27" show the "Disputed Property" that was quieted in Coleman by 
the District Court. The legal description of this parcel is contained in the Partial 
Judgment Quieting Title in Disputed Parcel of Real Property to Plaintiffs Terri Boyd-
Davis, Brian F. Davis and Jean L. Coleman entered on November 29,2012. (R., Vol. 
VII, pp. 1200-1203). 
" The western boundary line of the Coleman deed as interpreted by Stratton in his Figure 6 
is shown as a solid line on the above drawing, while it is shown as a dotted line in the 
survey drawing in Baker's Brief 
• The lines that are now dotted lines (that were solid lines on the previous survey) do not 
indicate Stratton's interpretation of the Coleman deeds but rather reflect "BNDY (D3) 
PER (R4)" and "(DS)." Stratton explains on page 2 of the Stratton Survey the documents 
these abbreviations refer to. D3 is the Deed from Clark to Coleman 12/2311970. R4 is 
Record of Survey by Evans 1112612007. DS is Deed from Gilbertson to Boyd-Davis, 
1/1112012. 
• With the rearrangement of the solid lines from those shown in the rejected survey, the 
correct survey shows the shape of the parcel is clearly a quadrilateral- NOT the "oddly-
shaped" parcel Baker alleges it is (as shown in a drawing on page 33 of Appellant's 
Brief). 
The changes made on the corrected survey take the wind out of the sails of Baker's 
arguments. Much of Baker's argument is based on their analysis of the wrong survey. Baker 
begins with a wrong premise and from there reaches faulty conclusions, which are found in their 
claims that: 1) the Stratton Survey shows the shape of the Coleman parcel as being something 
other than a quadrilateral; and 2) their claim that the District Court ignores virtually all of the 
distance and bearing calls in the deeds. A proper reading of the correct Stratton Survey, the one 
adopted by the District Court, shows neither of these claims is valid. 
The table contained on page 29 of the Appellant's Brief wherein Baker attempts to show 
error in the "Disputed Parcel per Partial Judgment," is completely flawed because it is based on 
the wrong survey. 
To properly construe Stratton's Survey (the correct one) it is necessary to read the 
Surveyor's Narrative on page 2 of the survey. Therein, Stratton explains why the rotation of the 
property made the most sense in interpreting the ambiguous deeds. It states: 
At the core of the court case was the location of those parcels described in (D2)19 
and (D3) which have senior title over the parcel described in (D4). The 
descriptions in (D2) and (D3) were prepared by Harry Clark, a property owner 
and have several contradictions that needed to be resolved in order to determine 
the location of the parcels. (Rl), (R3) and (R4) all offered similar but different 
interpretations of the location of these parcels. I disagreed with the locations 
shown on these surveys because they ignored calls to the west boundary of 
Highway 130, they used a different right-of-way alignment for (D2) and (D3) 
than they did for (D4) and they attempted to hold bearings over distances, which 
excessively distorted the shape of the parcels. I have shown my interpretation of 
the deeds on this survey. I held the call to the right-of-way over the point of 
commencement and distances over bearings. By doing so, the closure of (D2) 
was maintained and the parcels better fit roads and usage. The justification for 
this is that a layperson can better determine distances than they can 
determine a remote point of commencement or bearings and calls to natural 
monuments (the road) over measurements. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Baker's argument that Stratton ignores virtually every call in the deeds drafted by Harry 
Clark and that this results in an oddly-shaped parcel are based on the wrong survey. A review of 
the correct survey shows neither of these allegations is correct. Thus, it is not the District 
Court's findings that are "clearly erroneous" but rather Baker's argument based on a survey not 
adopted by the court. 
Additionally, when Baker makes the hypothetical argument that the "logical extent of Mr. 
Stratton's theory would require that all parcels for which Harry Clark drafted the deeds would 
need to be rotated 23 degrees counterclockwise, down to the section line," he raises a non-issue. 
19 All of Stratton's references in parentheses that contain either a D or an R followed by a 
number refer to either a Deed or Record of Survey as defined in his "Records Reviewed" section 
of the survey on page 2. 
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The only issue before the District Court was the ownership of the Disputed Parcel not other 
parcels that may contain legal descriptions authored by Harry Clark. Baker thus puts forth 
another fallacious argument that should be ignored. 
Despite the fact that Baker's arguments have no merit due to their failure to analyze the 
correct survey, Baker's argument that the District Court's reliance on surveyor Robert Stratton's 
opinions is clearly erroneous ignores the fact that it is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court to accept or reject the experts' opinions. In Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 644 P.2d 1333 
(1982), this Court was faced with a similar assertion. In Rueth, the Appellants "asserted that the 
testimony [of one of the experts was] inherently improbable" and the Appellant listed a number 
of reasons why it believed that was so. Id. at 78, 1337. 
In that case, the Court explained that the Appellant's "argument overlooks the fact that 
weighing the testimony of expert witnesses is uniquely within the competence of the trier of 
fact." Id The Supreme Court additionally explained in that case that although the district court's 
decision not to follow the testimony of the Appellant's expert witness completely was 
disappointing to the Appellant, it did not render its findings of fact clearly erroneous noting that 
"[s]imply stated, each side's expert presented differing opinions to the district court based on 
differing methodologies, and it was within the sound discretion of the district court to accept or 
reject each expert's opinions." 
In this case, the District Court accepted Stratton's Figure 6 as being the most consistent 
with the intent of the Clarks. Its decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence 
and should not be disturbed. 
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B. The District Court's "Alternative Decision" was issued solely in response to 
Baker's request that the Court rule on Coleman's alternative claims of relief. 
The District Court's "Alternative Decision" was issued in response to the post-trial briefs 
filed by Baker and Boyd-Davis. In Defendant Bakers' Post-trial Brief, they asked the Court to 
"quiet title to that portion of the Disputed Property which is reflected as the 'Overlap' in the 
Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit 23 to the Plaintiffs, and quiet title in the remainder of the Disputed 
Parcel to the Defendant's [sic] Baker." (R., Vol. VI, p. 1043, L. 17-19). Boyd-Davis, in her post-
trial brief, requested the Court find Coleman had proved their boundary by agreement claims. 
(R., Vol. VI, p. 1030-1039). 
Prior to these requests, the Court had not ruled on either the boundary by agreement or 
adverse possession claims since it had quieted titled in the Disputed Property to Coleman under 
the theory of the intent of the grantor. As the Court stated in its "Alternative Decision," it 
"address[ ed these two] remaining causes of action because the Bakers wish to appeal." (R., Vol. 
VI, p. 1086). But the Court also noted that the "Alternative Decision" would be "moot if the trial 
decision on the quiet title claim is upheld on appeal." (R., Vol. VI, p. 1087). 
With no evidence in the record to support their assertion, Baker claims in their Appellate 
Brief, that the Tucker surveyors "[r]ecognize[ed] that the call to the highway trumps the distance 
and bearing calls to the point of true beginning." The fact is - the reason why Tucker decided to 
place the boundary lines where he did is unknown. The record provides no evidence as to what 
Tucker's thought process was. What the record does reflect, however, is that Tucker created at 
least three surveys of the Coleman property (Ex. A, B, and 23), all of which vary in significant 
ways from the others, further proof of the difficulties involved in interpreting these ambiguous 
deeds. Baker's own expert, David Evans testified that he couldn't "say one way or the other 
whether [Tucker] held bearings over distances." (Trial Tr., p. 877, L. 5-12). 
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Oddly, the survey Baker would like this court to adopt as the best reflection of Clark's 
intent is the only one of the three Tucker surveys in the record that Tucker did not record for 
reasons unknown. Baker claims: "Doing this [accepting the unrecorded Tucker survey] allows 
the Coleman deed to fit the road, while maintaining all ofthe remaining calls in the 1970 
Coleman Deed." There is no support in the record for this statement. In fact, both parties' 
experts agreed that deeds were vague, hard to interpret, and could not close. (Trial Tr., p. 72, L. 
2-5; p. 864, L. 17-25). 
In asking this Court to adopt the District Court's "Alternative Decision," Baker repeats 
their faulty argument that the calls in the 1970 Coleman Deed are abandoned in the Court's 
partial judgment. Unfortunately, Baker's faulty conclusions as a result of their failure to 
properly construe the correct Stratton Survey permeates their brief. 
C. Baker's argument raised for the first time on appeal that the District Court 
reformed the Coleman deed has been brought improperly and should not be 
considered. 
Baker's argument that determining the District Court's interpretation of the ambiguous 
deeds is instead a reformation of the deed is a red herring. And it, like Baker's other arguments, 
is based on their faulty conclusions reached as a result of analyzing the wrong survey. 
Reformation of the deed is a legal theory that was never raised at the trial level and it 
does not apply to this case. Thus, there is no validity to this argument and no need to refute it. 
"It is well established that in order for an issue to be raised on appeal, the record must 
reveal an adverse ruling which forms the basis for an assignment of error." Whitted v. Canyon 
County Bd. 0fComm'rs. 137 Idaho 118, 121,44 P.3d 1173, 1176 (2002). "An issue not raised 
below will not be considered when raised for the first time on appeal." Post Falls Trailer Park v. 
Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634,637,962 P.2d 1018, 1021 (1998). 
Since this argument has been raised for the first time on appeal and the record reveals no 
adverse ruling, it need not and should not be considered. 
V. ARGUMENT TO AFFIRM THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT BAKER 
DID NOT PROVE THEIR LACHES DEFENSE 
A. The District Court properly rejected Baker's affirmative defense of laches 
because it found that Coleman had timely asserted their rights once invaded 
by Baker. 
The district court correctly found that the Bakers did not prove their affirmative defense 
of laches. In the Idaho Court of Appeals case of Landis v. Hodgson, the Court explained the 
defense of laches as follows: 
Whether or not a party is guilty of laches is a question of fact determined from all 
the evidence and circumstances adduced at trial. Huppert v. Wolford, 91 Idaho 
249,420 P.2d 11 (1966). To invoke the defense oflaches, Idaho requires the 
following elements to be proven: (1) defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights, (2) 
delay in asserting plaintiff's rights, the plaintiff having had notice and an 
opportunity to institute a suit, (3) lack of knowledge by defendant that plaintiff 
would assert his rights, and (4) injury or prejudice to defendant in event relief is 
accorded to plaintiff or the suit is not held to be barred. 
109 Idaho 252, 259, 706 P.2d 1363, 1370 (Idaho App. 1985) 
Once again, Baker begins with a wrong premise resulting in a faulty conclusion. His 
premise is that Coleman, the party in possession of the disputed property or as Baker puts it the 
one who was "utilizing a portion of the Johnson's property which she did not own" had a duty 
to assert a claim to the property. Baker's conclusion is that Coleman's alleged failure to do so 
for "almost 30 years," bars her under the doctrine of laches from doing so now. 
While Baker claims the district court's "analysis is clearly erroneous," it is Baker's 
analysis that is in error as is shown by Baker's statement that "Coleman invaded the rights of the 
Iohnsons." Baker has turned this defense on its head. If Coleman had, in fact, "invaded the 
of the Johnsons" for some 30 years and the Johnsons had failed to assert their rights for an 
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those years, then it would be Coleman who could claim the defense oflaches if the Johnsons had 
finally brought a quiet title action against them, but this is not the case. 
In this case, Coleman was in peaceable possession of the disputed property from 1970 
through 2008, when Baker first invaded Coleman's rights. Coleman was first made aware that 
Baker made a claim to the disputed property in the latter part of 2008 when Coleman discovered 
that Baker had tom down a portion of the fence that had divided Coleman's property from 
Baker's property. Coleman immediately asserted rights to the property, ultimately filing suit in 
April 2010 after the dispute escalated when Baker erected the chain link fence across the 
disputed property. 
Whether or not a party is guilty of laches primarily is a question of fact and therefore its 
determination is within the province of the trial court. It is reviewed under the abuse of 
discretion standard. Huppert v. Wolford, 91 Idaho 249, 420 P.2d 11 (1966). 
In this case, the determination of whether Coleman was guilty of laches was within the 
province of the District Court. The court's finding that Baker had invaded Coleman's rights 
when they tore down a portion of the fence in 2008 and its finding that there was no material 
delay by Coleman in asserting their rights is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Baker claims the Court's analysis is clearly erroneous, stating that Coleman invaded the 
rights of Baker's predecessors "by knowingly utilizing a portion of the Johnsons' property which 
she did not own." Baker claims the Court erred by failing to consider this defense from the 
standpoint of the Bakers. It is Baker's analysis that is clearly erroneous not the Court's. This 
is demonstrated by a holding in a recent Idaho Supreme Court case. 
In the matter of Peterson v. Gentillon, 296 P.3d 390 (2013), this Court considered similar 
claims. In that case, the Appellant argued that the district court erred in dismissing its claim for 
specific performance on an agreement because the five-year statute of limitations had not yet run 
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against the claim. The Appellant urged the Supreme Court to adopt a rule that the statute of 
limitations does not begin to run against actions for specific performance of a contract where the 
claimant or vendee is in possession of the property. This Court reasoned: 
Indeed, because a claimant in possession of property has little reason to bring a 
specific performance claim as to that property, many states have adopted a rule 
that statutes of limitations do not run against a claimant in possession until that 
possession is interrupted. See, e.g., Richards v. Richards, 209 Ga. 839, 76 S.E.2d 
492,497 (1953) ("It is well settled that neither laches nor the statute of 
limitations will run against one in peaceable possession of property under a 
claim of ownership for delay in resorting to a court of equity to establish his 
rights."); Dotson v. Aldridge, 246 Ark. 456~ 438 S.W.2d 464, 466 (1969) (noting 
rule that "there is no necessity for resorting to legal remedies until there is an 
interference with possession"); Withroder v. Wiederoder, 156 Kan. 570, 134 
P.2d 381, 385 (1943) (holding that the statute of limitations did not bar a quiet 
title action commenced eight years after execution of contract for exchange of 
interests because the plaintiff was in possession and could bring the action at any 
time at his convenience); Martinez v. Archuleta-Padia, 143 P.3d 1112, 1115 
(Colo.App.2006) (noting that "the general rule is that those in actual possession of 
real estate are never barred by any statute of limitation from seeking to quiet their 
title"); Clary v. Stack Steel & Supply Co., 611 P.2d 80,83 (Alaska 1980) 
("Normally no statute of limitations applies to a quiet title action brought by a 
person in possession of real property."); Viersen v. Boettcher, 387 P.2d 133, 138 
(Okla. 1963) (recognizing that "an action to quiet title, where the plaintiff has been 
in continuous possession of the property, claiming ownership therein, can be 
maintained at any time, and no statute of limitation bars his right to the relief 
sought"). 
Id at 395-396. (Emphasis added.) 
This Court found "these authorities persuasive" and concluded "that the statute of 
limitations does not bar a claimant who has purchased real property and is in possession of that 
property from asserting a claim for specific performance. A claim for specific performance does 
not begin to run against a claimant in possession until the claimant's possession is interrupted." 
at 396. 
In the same way, Coleman, who was in peaceable possession of the disputed property 
from 1970 through 2008, was not barred by the defense of laches from seeking to quiet title to 
the property. 
VI. CROSS APPEAL ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether 
Coleman had proved they had established a boundary based on an implied 
agreement. 
In denying Coleman's boundary by agreement claim, the District Court erred in applying 
the standard applicable to determining whether a boundary has been established pursuant to an 
express agreement when the proper inquiry would have been whether Coleman had proven 
whether an agreement was established by an implied agreement. 
While it may appear unnecessary to rule on this issue on cross-appeal if the Court rejects 
the issues raised by the Appellants, this issue remains significant because in determining that the 
Clarks intended to grant the property north of the "fence line" to Coleman, it was still necessary 
in interpreting the ambiguous deeds that the Coleman parcel retain its quadrilateral shape 
pursuant to the calls in the deed. This resulted in a small portion of the "Disputed Property" on 
its western side not being quieted in Coleman (see figure below for clarification). Thus, the 
court found that this small portion of the Disputed Property is owned by Baker although it is 
north of the "fence line." 
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The District Court quieted 
title to Coleman under the 
theory of intent of the 
grantor. It also found that 
the ambiguous deed 
described a parcel with a 
quadrilateral shape. 
Because this small section 
on the western side of the 
Disputed Property falls 
outside the quadrilateral 
shape, the Court found it 
was not contained in the 
Clark to Coleman deed. 
Thus, the Court found that 
Coleman had not proved 
their quiet title claims to this 
portion of the Disputed 
Property under that theory. 
(R., Vol. VI, pp. 1080-1081). 
A finding that the parties had established a boundary by agreement would result in all of 
the property north of the fence line being quieted in Coleman. In light of the fact that the District 
Court made findings that the parties treated the fence line as the boundary throughout their 36 
years of ownership, this makes the most sense and is legally sound as argued below. 
"Review of the lower court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence 
supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings offact support the conclusions oflaw." 
Alumetv. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946,812 P.2d 253 (1991). "We exercise free 
review over the lower court's conclusions of law to determine whether the court correctly stated 
the applicable law, and whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found. Conley v. 
Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 269-270, 985 P.2d 1127, 1131-1132 (1999). 
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It is proper for this Court to review the District Court's conclusions oflaw to determine 
whether its conclusion that Coleman had not proven her boundary by agreement claim based 
upon an implied agreement was in error. 
One month after trial on April 28, 2011, the District Court announced its findings offact 
and conclusions of law. Having found that the disputed property was quieted in Coleman based 
upon a theory of the grantor's intent, the Court did not, at that time, announce its conclusions of 
law relative to Coleman's boundary by agreement claim. The Court did at that time, however, 
announce as one of its findings of fact pertinent to Coleman's boundary by agreement claim 
"that as to the use of the real property by the Johnsons and Ms. Coleman that the fence line was 
treated as the boundary line." (Trial Tr., p. 1029, L. 13-19, see also Trial Tr., p. 1030, L. 19-20). 
The District Court did not make its conclusions of law related to Coleman's boundary by 
agreement claim until 15 months after trial had ended on July 13,2012, and it did so then after 
both Coleman and Baker filed post-trial briefs on April 30, 2012. Baker had made known their 
intent to appeal the case and although the Court had quieted title in Coleman under the theory of 
the grantor's intent, Baker wanted the Court to issue its ruling on all the theories pled by the 
parties, including adverse possession and boundary by agreement. (R., Vol. VI, p. 1086). 
In its Memorandum Decision Re: Remaining Liability Causes of Action in Plaintiff s 
Third Amended Complaint issued on July 13,2012, the Court found that "because of the 
ambiguous nature of the deeds and because the respective parcels had not been surveyed at the 
time the fence was built, the first element of proof of boundary by agreement, that 'there must be 
an uncertain or disputed boundary,' is met." (R., Vol. VI, p. 1097). In considering the second 
element of boundary by agreement, that there was an agreement fixing the boundary, the Court 
addressed the testimony of Clifford Johnson, stating: 
In the trial decision, the Court found that the testimony of Cliff Johnson was 
impeached, which implies that his testimony was unreliable. The Court did not 
believe that Mr. Johnson would start building a fence at what he believed to be the 
comer of his property, and then proceed randomly, not following what he 
believed to be the boundary line. Rather, it appeared that in the hypercharged 
atmosphere surrounding these proceedings, Mr. Johnson felt pressure to testify in 
a manner consistent with the position put forth by his co-defendants20, the Bakers. 
Nonetheless, Mr. Johnson's testimony was contrary to the plaintiffs' assertion of a 
boundary by agreement/acquiescence. 
(R., Vol. VI, p. 1097-1098). 
The Court then applied its conclusions of law to its findings of fact as follows: 
The only way a decision can be rendered that an agreement was made between 
Jean Coleman and the Johnsons that the fence line was the boundary line is to 
accept an "implied easement21" or acquiescence version of the facts. Even if such 
a finding is made, as set forth in Flying Elk investment, LLC v. Cornwall, 
acquiescence alone is not enough to establish a boundary by agreement. In light 
of the denial by Cliff Johnson that there was an agreement between the 
neighbors that the fence line was to be the property line, and little or no 
corroboration that an agreement was made to treat the fence line as the 
boundary, the conclusion is reached that the plaintiffs did not prove a 
necessary material element of this claim. 
(Emphasis added). (R., Vol. VI, p. 1098). 
Earlier, in its findings of fact, the Court had stated that found it "telling" that during his 
trial testimony, Clifford Johnson referred to the property south of the fence as "my side of the 
fence." (Trial Tr., p. 1028, L. 5). 
The District Court erred in its analysis by basing its decision on "the denial by Cliff 
Johnson that there was an agreement between the neighbors that the fence line was to be the 
property line," despite the fact that it was quite apparent, as even the Court itself noted, that Cliff 
20 It should be pointed out that the Johnsons were not parties to this case but were, rather, 
Baker's precedessors in interest. The Court mistakenly referred to Clifford Johnson as a co-
defendant. 
21 It is apparent that the Court mistakenly used the word "easement" here when it meant 
"agreement. " 
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Johnson "felt pressure to testify in a manner consistent with the position put forth by [Baker]." 
While this would be the proper analysis to undertake if Coleman claimed an agreement by an 
express agreement, this is not the proper analysis to undertake when considering whether an 
implied agreement had been made to treat the fence line as the boundary line. 
The proper analysis can be found in a review of the case of Edgeller v. Johnston, 262 
P2d 1006 (1953) where, like the instant case, there was "no direct evidence in the record ofa 
mutually agreed boundary." Id at 1009. The defendants in the case appealed "contend[ing] that 
there [was] no evidence to support an agreed boundary between the conterminous owners and for 
this reason [they asked the appellate court to reverse] the finding that the plaintiff and her 
predecessors in interest held the disputed area adversely." Id Because of the lack of evidence 
that there was a mutually agreed boundary, the Idaho Supreme Court set forth the proper 
analysis to be undertaken to determine if an implied agreement had been reached. It stated 
that "[a]determination of this question must necessarily be made from the acts and conduct 
of the parties and their predecessors in interest, evaluated in the light of the surrounding 
circumstances." Id. (Emphasis added). 
The Edgeller Court confirmed that "[a]n agreement, fixing a boundary line, need not be 
shown by direct evidence but may be inferred from acts and conduct and especially from long 
acquiescence." Id. at 1010. It further confirmed that "[s]uch an agreement may be presumed to 
arise between adjoining landowners where such right has been definitely defined by erection of a 
fence or other monument on the line followed by such adjoining landowners treating it as fixing 
the boundary for such length of time that neither ought to be allowed to deny the correctness of 
its location." Id. The Edgeller Court upheld the trial court's finding because "the parties, by 
their acts and the circumstances surrounding such, recognized and agreed upon the location of 
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the boundary line and acquiesced in such location for a period of time in excess of the 
requirements of the statute." Jd. 
These facts, nearly identical to ours, warrant a similar finding. The District Court erred 
in its application ofthe law when it determined that an agreement needed to be shown by direct 
evidence (i.e. the testimony of Cliff Johnson) rather than from the acts and conduct and the long 
period of acquiescence. 
The Court made the following specific findings of fact as to the Johnson's conduct and 
beliefs concerning the fence: 
I do want to further address the testimony of Cliff [Johnson]. As I mentioned 
earlier, he is a nice person. His testimony, however, was impeached. He was 
shown to have a bias. This court does not accept his statement that he would have 
begun the fence at what he thought was the northeast corner of his property and 
then go willy-nilly off what he believed to be the line which then would 
conveniently fit the theory of the defense. Further, the use as evidenced by the 
parties reflect that they treated the fence line as the boundary line. The Johnsons 
never used the property north of the line and they shut off the gate so as to 
preclude them from having access, at least by vehicle, to the northern portion of 
what is now claimed to have been their piece their portion of property. They 
also rebuilt the fence in the same position ... 
In looking and evaluating all of the testimony, all of the facts and all of the 
evidence that has been submitted, despite his statement, it makes more sense that 
- and I do find on a more probable than not basis that he built the balance of the 
fence on what he thought was the boundary line. That doesn't mean that that was 
specifically the boundary line but it does appear and I do find that that was what 
the parties thought the boundary line to be. 
(Trial Tr., p. 1039,1. 25; p. 1040,1. 1-15,21-25; p. 1041,1. 1-4). (Emphasis added). 
In the case of Weitz v. Green, 230 P.3d 743 (2010), one of the issues on appeal was 
whether the district court's evidence supported its conclusions of law that the Appellants had 
failed to prove their claims of boundary by agreementlacquiescence22. The Weitz case is helpful 
to our case because it found that the "district court's analysis as to the second element of 
boundary by agreement or acquiescence was erroneous," stating that "the appropriate inquiry 
would have been whether Appellants submitted sufficient evidence from which the fact-finder, 
here the district court, should have inferred that an agreement to treat the fence as a boundary 
was made during [the relevant time period]." Id. at 752. This is exactly the inquiry the District 
Court should have made in the instant case - was there sufficient evidence from which the 
District Court should have inferred that an agreement to treat the fence as a boundary was made? 
The inquiry as to whether Clifford Johnson admitted there was an agreement was improper. 
There was overwhelming evidence to infer that Coleman and the Johnsons had an 
agreement to treat the fence as the boundary. This is evidenced from the District Court's stated 
findings of fact that "the use as evidenced by the parties reflect that they treated the fence line as 
the boundary line" and that Clifford Johnson "built the balance of the fence on what he thought 
was the boundary line." (Trial Tr., p. 1040, L. 8-10,25; p. 1041, L. 1). 
The case of Wells v. Williamson, 794 P.2d 626, 118 Idaho 37 (1990) also speaks to the 
issue we face. In that case, the Appellant claimed the district court had wrongly concluded that a 
boundary by agreement had been established for a number of reasons one being, that he, like 
Cliff Johnson, claimed "he never agreed to treat the southern fence line as the boundary between 
the properties" and his claim that the fence "was constructed by his predecessor in interest as a 
22 While in that case, the Supreme Court ultimately determined that the district court had rightly 
determined that the Appellants had not proved their boundary by agreement claims, it made this 
determination based upon the fact the Respondents were bonafide purchasers for value and thus 
they had purchased the property without notice of a boundary by agreement. This set of facts 
does not apply to our case. 
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barrier to keep cattle from wandering into the river and that he, Williamson, regards the fence in 
the same manner, i.e., as a barrier but not as a boundary." Id. at 630. 
In that case, the Supreme Court found that the first element for establishing a boundary 
by agreement had been met. It then addressed the second element and the Appellant's "argument 
that he never agreed to treat the southern fenceline as a boundary." The facts are nearly identical 
to ours: 1) The Appellant claimed there was never an agreement regarding the boundary; 2) 
The Respondents had used the disputed property for nearly 20 years23 and during that time the 
Appellant had never registered a complaint or made a claim that the property was actually his. 
(Trial Tr., p. 392,1.18-22) 3) It appeared from the Appellant's testimony that before the survey 
was done, he did not even believe the disputed property was his. (Trial Tr., p. 355,1. 10-20). 
[J]t is true that no "express" or "mutual" agreement was ever reached between the 
parties. However, we have already noted that an express agreement is not a 
prerequisite to a finding ofa boundary by agreement. We were aware in O'Malley 
v. Jones that "there [was] no direct evidence of any mutual agreement ... ," so that 
the question of the agreed upon boundary "must therefore be determined from the 
conduct of the parties, viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances." 46 
Idaho at 140,266 P. at 798. We went on to state that "[a]n agreement fixing the, 
boundary line need not be shown by direct evidence, but may be inferred from 
conduct, and especially from long acquiescence." 46 Idaho at 141,266 P. at 798. 
Similarly, in O'Malley v. Jones, 46 Idaho 137,266 P. 797 (1928), the appellant 
had completely acquiesced to respondenfs possession of the disputed property for 
over thirty-two years, a fact which we found to be of "impelling force against the 
contentions of the appellant." 46 Idaho at 141,266 P. at 798. 
In conclusion, we think the facts necessary to a finding of boundary by agreement 
are present on the record before us and that those facts remain undisputed. We 
also find no error on the part of the district court when it inferred from those 
facts an implied agreement to treat the southern fenceline as the boundary 
because that inference was reasonably supported by the record and thus 
23 In our case~ Coleman used the property north of the fence line for over 36 years before Baker 
invaded their rights. 
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consonant with the standards set forth in Riverside v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 
P.2d 657 (1982). 
Finally, in F(ving Elk Investment, LLC v. Cornwall! 149 Idaho 9, 232 P.3d 330 (2010), 
the appellant, Flying Elk, the party in the position of the Bakers (i.e. the party who had the 
property surveyed and whose survey revealed the fence intruded onto his deeded property), like 
Baker, attempted to disprove the boundary by agreement by emphasizing that the son of the 
previous property owner had testified that he and his father had believed the fence was a 
temporary restraint kept in place until a survey could be completed. However, the Supreme 
Court stated that "the Court can only evaluate the parties' conduct, not their 'mental 
operations.'" (citing Bayhouse v. Urguides, 17 Idaho 286, 294 (1909». Id. at 11. The court can 
only evaluate the conduct of the parties. And this is where the District Court erred. It erred 
because it based its decision on the testinwny of a witness it found to be biased, It simply 
applied the wrong standard. Therefore, the decision of the District Court as it relates to 
Coleman's boundary by agreement claim should be set aside, and based on the findings of fact 
made by the District C9urt, this Court should apply the Pf9per legal standard and find that 
Coleman proved there was a boundary by agreement based upon an implied agreement. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The findings of the District Court are supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Therefore, its findings are not clearly erroneous, and Appellant Baker's request that this Court 
set the findings of the District Court aside should be rejected. Baker's assertion that the District 
Court's findings are clearly erroneous is largely based on Baker's fatal error in analyzing the 
survey rejected by the District Court rather than the correct survey the District Court adopted 
after ordering that the errors it found in the previous survey be fixed. 
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The District Court erred in its application of the legal standard appropriate to determining 
if Coleman had proven their boundary by agreement claims based on an implied agreement. 
Because the District Court's findings of fact support their claim that an implied agreement had 
been reached, this Court should overturn the District Court's decision on this claim and quiet title 
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